diff options
| author | mo khan <mo@mokhan.ca> | 2025-07-15 16:37:08 -0600 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | mo khan <mo@mokhan.ca> | 2025-07-17 16:30:22 -0600 |
| commit | 45df4d0d9b577fecee798d672695fe24ff57fb1b (patch) | |
| tree | 1b99bf645035b58e0d6db08c7a83521f41f7a75b /vendor/httparse/src/simd/avx2.rs | |
| parent | f94f79608393d4ab127db63cc41668445ef6b243 (diff) | |
feat: migrate from Cedar to SpiceDB authorization system
This is a major architectural change that replaces the Cedar policy-based
authorization system with SpiceDB's relation-based authorization.
Key changes:
- Migrate from Rust to Go implementation
- Replace Cedar policies with SpiceDB schema and relationships
- Switch from envoy `ext_authz` with Cedar to SpiceDB permission checks
- Update build system and dependencies for Go ecosystem
- Maintain Envoy integration for external authorization
This change enables more flexible permission modeling through SpiceDB's
Google Zanzibar inspired relation-based system, supporting complex
hierarchical permissions that were difficult to express in Cedar.
Breaking change: Existing Cedar policies and Rust-based configuration
will no longer work and need to be migrated to SpiceDB schema.
Diffstat (limited to 'vendor/httparse/src/simd/avx2.rs')
| -rw-r--r-- | vendor/httparse/src/simd/avx2.rs | 206 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 206 deletions
diff --git a/vendor/httparse/src/simd/avx2.rs b/vendor/httparse/src/simd/avx2.rs deleted file mode 100644 index 2adf0a28..00000000 --- a/vendor/httparse/src/simd/avx2.rs +++ /dev/null @@ -1,206 +0,0 @@ -use crate::iter::Bytes; - -#[inline] -#[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] -pub unsafe fn match_uri_vectored(bytes: &mut Bytes) { - while bytes.as_ref().len() >= 32 { - - let advance = match_url_char_32_avx(bytes.as_ref()); - - bytes.advance(advance); - - if advance != 32 { - return; - } - } - // NOTE: use SWAR for <32B, more efficient than falling back to SSE4.2 - super::swar::match_uri_vectored(bytes) -} - -#[inline(always)] -#[allow(non_snake_case, overflowing_literals)] -#[allow(unused)] -unsafe fn match_url_char_32_avx(buf: &[u8]) -> usize { - // NOTE: This check might be not necessary since this function is only used in - // `match_uri_vectored` where buffer overflow is taken care of. - debug_assert!(buf.len() >= 32); - - #[cfg(target_arch = "x86")] - use core::arch::x86::*; - #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] - use core::arch::x86_64::*; - - // pointer to buffer - let ptr = buf.as_ptr(); - - // %x21-%x7e %x80-%xff - // - // Character ranges allowed by this function, can also be interpreted as: - // 33 =< (x != 127) =< 255 - // - // Create a vector full of DEL (0x7f) characters. - let DEL: __m256i = _mm256_set1_epi8(0x7f); - // Create a vector full of exclamation mark (!) (0x21) characters. - // Used as lower threshold, characters in URLs cannot be smaller than this. - let LOW: __m256i = _mm256_set1_epi8(0x21); - - // Load a chunk of 32 bytes from `ptr` as a vector. - // We can check 32 bytes in parallel at most with AVX2 since - // YMM registers can only have 256 bits most. - let dat = _mm256_lddqu_si256(ptr as *const _); - - // unsigned comparison dat >= LOW - // - // `_mm256_max_epu8` creates a new vector by comparing vectors `dat` and `LOW` - // and picks the max. values from each for all indices. - // So if a byte in `dat` is <= 32, it'll be represented as 33 - // which is the smallest valid character. - // - // Then, we compare the new vector with `dat` for equality. - // - // `_mm256_cmpeq_epi8` returns a new vector where; - // * matching bytes are set to 0xFF (all bits set), - // * nonmatching bytes are set to 0 (no bits set). - let low = _mm256_cmpeq_epi8(_mm256_max_epu8(dat, LOW), dat); - // Similar to what we did before, but now invalid characters are set to 0xFF. - let del = _mm256_cmpeq_epi8(dat, DEL); - - // We glue the both comparisons via `_mm256_andnot_si256`. - // - // Since the representation of truthiness differ in these comparisons, - // we are in need of bitwise NOT to convert valid characters of `del`. - let bit = _mm256_andnot_si256(del, low); - // This creates a bitmask from the most significant bit of each byte. - // Simply, we're converting a vector value to scalar value here. - let res = _mm256_movemask_epi8(bit) as u32; - - // Count trailing zeros to find the first encountered invalid character. - // Bitwise NOT is required once again to flip truthiness. - // TODO: use .trailing_ones() once MSRV >= 1.46 - (!res).trailing_zeros() as usize -} - -#[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] -pub unsafe fn match_header_value_vectored(bytes: &mut Bytes) { - while bytes.as_ref().len() >= 32 { - let advance = match_header_value_char_32_avx(bytes.as_ref()); - bytes.advance(advance); - - if advance != 32 { - return; - } - } - // NOTE: use SWAR for <32B, more efficient than falling back to SSE4.2 - super::swar::match_header_value_vectored(bytes) -} - -#[inline(always)] -#[allow(non_snake_case)] -#[allow(unused)] -unsafe fn match_header_value_char_32_avx(buf: &[u8]) -> usize { - debug_assert!(buf.len() >= 32); - - #[cfg(target_arch = "x86")] - use core::arch::x86::*; - #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] - use core::arch::x86_64::*; - - let ptr = buf.as_ptr(); - - // %x09 %x20-%x7e %x80-%xff - // Create a vector full of horizontal tab (\t) (0x09) characters. - let TAB: __m256i = _mm256_set1_epi8(0x09); - // Create a vector full of DEL (0x7f) characters. - let DEL: __m256i = _mm256_set1_epi8(0x7f); - // Create a vector full of space (0x20) characters. - let LOW: __m256i = _mm256_set1_epi8(0x20); - - // Load a chunk of 32 bytes from `ptr` as a vector. - let dat = _mm256_lddqu_si256(ptr as *const _); - - // unsigned comparison dat >= LOW - // - // Same as what we do in `match_url_char_32_avx`. - // This time the lower threshold is set to space character though. - let low = _mm256_cmpeq_epi8(_mm256_max_epu8(dat, LOW), dat); - // Check if `dat` includes `TAB` characters. - let tab = _mm256_cmpeq_epi8(dat, TAB); - // Check if `dat` includes `DEL` characters. - let del = _mm256_cmpeq_epi8(dat, DEL); - - // Combine all comparisons together, notice that we're also using OR - // to connect `low` and `tab` but flip bits of `del`. - // - // In the end, this is simply: - // ~del & (low | tab) - let bit = _mm256_andnot_si256(del, _mm256_or_si256(low, tab)); - // This creates a bitmask from the most significant bit of each byte. - // Creates a scalar value from vector value. - let res = _mm256_movemask_epi8(bit) as u32; - - // Count trailing zeros to find the first encountered invalid character. - // Bitwise NOT is required once again to flip truthiness. - // TODO: use .trailing_ones() once MSRV >= 1.46 - (!res).trailing_zeros() as usize -} - -#[test] -fn avx2_code_matches_uri_chars_table() { - if !is_x86_feature_detected!("avx2") { - return; - } - - #[allow(clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks)] - unsafe { - assert!(byte_is_allowed(b'_', match_uri_vectored)); - - for (b, allowed) in crate::URI_MAP.iter().cloned().enumerate() { - assert_eq!( - byte_is_allowed(b as u8, match_uri_vectored), allowed, - "byte_is_allowed({:?}) should be {:?}", b, allowed, - ); - } - } -} - -#[test] -fn avx2_code_matches_header_value_chars_table() { - if !is_x86_feature_detected!("avx2") { - return; - } - - #[allow(clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks)] - unsafe { - assert!(byte_is_allowed(b'_', match_header_value_vectored)); - - for (b, allowed) in crate::HEADER_VALUE_MAP.iter().cloned().enumerate() { - assert_eq!( - byte_is_allowed(b as u8, match_header_value_vectored), allowed, - "byte_is_allowed({:?}) should be {:?}", b, allowed, - ); - } - } -} - -#[cfg(test)] -unsafe fn byte_is_allowed(byte: u8, f: unsafe fn(bytes: &mut Bytes<'_>)) -> bool { - let slice = [ - b'_', b'_', b'_', b'_', - b'_', b'_', b'_', b'_', - b'_', b'_', b'_', b'_', - b'_', b'_', b'_', b'_', - b'_', b'_', b'_', b'_', - b'_', b'_', b'_', b'_', - b'_', b'_', byte, b'_', - b'_', b'_', b'_', b'_', - ]; - let mut bytes = Bytes::new(&slice); - - f(&mut bytes); - - match bytes.pos() { - 32 => true, - 26 => false, - _ => unreachable!(), - } -} |
