//! Solaris implementation using getrandom(2). //! //! While getrandom(2) has been available since Solaris 11.3, it has a few //! quirks not present on other OSes. First, on Solaris 11.3, calls will always //! fail if bufsz > 1024. Second, it will always either fail or completely fill //! the buffer (returning bufsz). Third, error is indicated by returning 0, //! rather than by returning -1. Finally, "if GRND_RANDOM is not specified //! then getrandom(2) is always a non blocking call". This _might_ imply that //! in early-boot scenarios with low entropy, getrandom(2) will not properly //! block. To be safe, we set GRND_RANDOM, mirroring the man page examples. //! //! For more information, see the man page linked in lib.rs and this blog post: //! https://blogs.oracle.com/solaris/post/solaris-new-system-calls-getentropy2-and-getrandom2 //! which also explains why this crate should not use getentropy(2). use crate::Error; use core::{ffi::c_void, mem::MaybeUninit}; pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64}; #[path = "../util_libc.rs"] mod util_libc; const MAX_BYTES: usize = 1024; #[inline] pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit]) -> Result<(), Error> { for chunk in dest.chunks_mut(MAX_BYTES) { let ptr = chunk.as_mut_ptr().cast::(); let ret = unsafe { libc::getrandom(ptr, chunk.len(), libc::GRND_RANDOM) }; // In case the man page has a typo, we also check for negative ret. // If getrandom(2) succeeds, it should have completely filled chunk. match usize::try_from(ret) { // Good. Keep going. Ok(ret) if ret == chunk.len() => {} // The syscall failed. Ok(0) => return Err(util_libc::last_os_error()), // All other cases should be impossible. _ => return Err(Error::UNEXPECTED), } } Ok(()) }