chore: add vendor directory

22 files changed, 1557 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/apple_other.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/apple_other.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c7b51c0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/apple_other.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+//! Implementation for iOS, tvOS, and watchOS where `getentropy` is unavailable.
+use crate::Error;
+use core::{ffi::c_void, mem::MaybeUninit};
+
+pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64};
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    let dst_ptr = dest.as_mut_ptr().cast::<c_void>();
+    let ret = unsafe { libc::CCRandomGenerateBytes(dst_ptr, dest.len()) };
+    if ret == libc::kCCSuccess {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        Err(Error::IOS_RANDOM_GEN)
+    }
+}
+
+impl Error {
+    /// Call to `CCRandomGenerateBytes` failed.
+    pub(crate) const IOS_RANDOM_GEN: Error = Self::new_internal(10);
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/custom.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/custom.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c505481a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/custom.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+//! An implementation which calls out to an externally defined function.
+use crate::Error;
+use core::mem::MaybeUninit;
+
+pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64};
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    extern "Rust" {
+        fn __getrandom_v03_custom(dest: *mut u8, len: usize) -> Result<(), Error>;
+    }
+    unsafe { __getrandom_v03_custom(dest.as_mut_ptr().cast(), dest.len()) }
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/efi_rng.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/efi_rng.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..768c8cc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/efi_rng.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+//! Implementation for UEFI using EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL
+use crate::Error;
+use core::{
+    mem::MaybeUninit,
+    ptr::{self, null_mut, NonNull},
+    sync::atomic::{AtomicPtr, Ordering::Relaxed},
+};
+use r_efi::{
+    efi::{BootServices, Handle},
+    protocols::rng,
+};
+
+extern crate std;
+
+pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64};
+
+#[cfg(not(target_os = "uefi"))]
+compile_error!("`efi_rng` backend can be enabled only for UEFI targets!");
+
+static RNG_PROTOCOL: AtomicPtr<rng::Protocol> = AtomicPtr::new(null_mut());
+
+#[cold]
+#[inline(never)]
+fn init() -> Result<NonNull<rng::Protocol>, Error> {
+    const HANDLE_SIZE: usize = size_of::<Handle>();
+
+    let boot_services = std::os::uefi::env::boot_services()
+        .ok_or(Error::BOOT_SERVICES_UNAVAILABLE)?
+        .cast::<BootServices>();
+
+    let mut handles = [ptr::null_mut(); 16];
+    // `locate_handle` operates with length in bytes
+    let mut buf_size = handles.len() * HANDLE_SIZE;
+    let mut guid = rng::PROTOCOL_GUID;
+    let ret = unsafe {
+        ((*boot_services.as_ptr()).locate_handle)(
+            r_efi::efi::BY_PROTOCOL,
+            &mut guid,
+            null_mut(),
+            &mut buf_size,
+            handles.as_mut_ptr(),
+        )
+    };
+
+    if ret.is_error() {
+        return Err(Error::from_uefi_code(ret.as_usize()));
+    }
+
+    let handles_len = buf_size / HANDLE_SIZE;
+    let handles = handles.get(..handles_len).ok_or(Error::UNEXPECTED)?;
+
+    let system_handle = std::os::uefi::env::image_handle();
+    for &handle in handles {
+        let mut protocol: MaybeUninit<*mut rng::Protocol> = MaybeUninit::uninit();
+
+        let mut protocol_guid = rng::PROTOCOL_GUID;
+        let ret = unsafe {
+            ((*boot_services.as_ptr()).open_protocol)(
+                handle,
+                &mut protocol_guid,
+                protocol.as_mut_ptr().cast(),
+                system_handle.as_ptr(),
+                ptr::null_mut(),
+                r_efi::system::OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL,
+            )
+        };
+
+        let protocol = if ret.is_error() {
+            continue;
+        } else {
+            let protocol = unsafe { protocol.assume_init() };
+            NonNull::new(protocol).ok_or(Error::UNEXPECTED)?
+        };
+
+        // Try to use the acquired protocol handle
+        let mut buf = [0u8; 8];
+        let mut alg_guid = rng::ALGORITHM_RAW;
+        let ret = unsafe {
+            ((*protocol.as_ptr()).get_rng)(
+                protocol.as_ptr(),
+                &mut alg_guid,
+                buf.len(),
+                buf.as_mut_ptr(),
+            )
+        };
+
+        if ret.is_error() {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        RNG_PROTOCOL.store(protocol.as_ptr(), Relaxed);
+        return Ok(protocol);
+    }
+    Err(Error::NO_RNG_HANDLE)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    let protocol = match NonNull::new(RNG_PROTOCOL.load(Relaxed)) {
+        Some(p) => p,
+        None => init()?,
+    };
+
+    let mut alg_guid = rng::ALGORITHM_RAW;
+    let ret = unsafe {
+        ((*protocol.as_ptr()).get_rng)(
+            protocol.as_ptr(),
+            &mut alg_guid,
+            dest.len(),
+            dest.as_mut_ptr().cast::<u8>(),
+        )
+    };
+
+    if ret.is_error() {
+        Err(Error::from_uefi_code(ret.as_usize()))
+    } else {
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+impl Error {
+    pub(crate) const BOOT_SERVICES_UNAVAILABLE: Error = Self::new_internal(10);
+    pub(crate) const NO_RNG_HANDLE: Error = Self::new_internal(11);
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/esp_idf.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/esp_idf.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4d1689dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/esp_idf.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+//! Implementation for ESP-IDF
+use crate::Error;
+use core::{ffi::c_void, mem::MaybeUninit};
+
+pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64};
+
+extern "C" {
+    fn esp_fill_random(buf: *mut c_void, len: usize) -> u32;
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    // Not that NOT enabling WiFi, BT, or the voltage noise entropy source (via `bootloader_random_enable`)
+    // will cause ESP-IDF to return pseudo-random numbers based on the voltage noise entropy, after the initial boot process:
+    // https://docs.espressif.com/projects/esp-idf/en/latest/esp32/api-reference/system/random.html
+    //
+    // However tracking if some of these entropy sources is enabled is way too difficult to implement here
+    unsafe { esp_fill_random(dest.as_mut_ptr().cast(), dest.len()) };
+
+    Ok(())
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/fuchsia.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/fuchsia.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b5f1ade5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/fuchsia.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+//! Implementation for Fuchsia Zircon
+use crate::Error;
+use core::mem::MaybeUninit;
+
+pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64};
+
+#[link(name = "zircon")]
+extern "C" {
+    fn zx_cprng_draw(buffer: *mut u8, length: usize);
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    unsafe { zx_cprng_draw(dest.as_mut_ptr().cast::<u8>(), dest.len()) }
+    Ok(())
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/getentropy.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/getentropy.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ed181f01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/getentropy.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+//! Implementation using getentropy(2)
+//!
+//! Available since:
+//!   - macOS 10.12
+//!   - OpenBSD 5.6
+//!   - Emscripten 2.0.5
+//!   - vita newlib since Dec 2021
+//!
+//! For these targets, we use getentropy(2) because getrandom(2) doesn't exist.
+use crate::Error;
+use core::{ffi::c_void, mem::MaybeUninit};
+
+pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64};
+
+#[path = "../util_libc.rs"]
+mod util_libc;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    for chunk in dest.chunks_mut(256) {
+        let ret = unsafe { libc::getentropy(chunk.as_mut_ptr().cast::<c_void>(), chunk.len()) };
+        if ret != 0 {
+            return Err(util_libc::last_os_error());
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/getrandom.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/getrandom.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..27d5a1f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/getrandom.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+//! Implementation using getrandom(2).
+//!
+//! Available since:
+//!   - Linux Kernel 3.17, Glibc 2.25, Musl 1.1.20
+//!   - Android API level 23 (Marshmallow)
+//!   - NetBSD 10.0
+//!   - FreeBSD 12.0
+//!   - illumos since Dec 2018
+//!   - DragonFly 5.7
+//!   - Hurd Glibc 2.31
+//!   - shim-3ds since Feb 2022
+//!
+//! For these platforms, we always use the default pool and never set the
+//! GRND_RANDOM flag to use the /dev/random pool. On Linux/Android/Hurd, using
+//! GRND_RANDOM is not recommended. On NetBSD/FreeBSD/Dragonfly/3ds, it does
+//! nothing. On illumos, the default pool is used to implement getentropy(2),
+//! so we assume it is acceptable here.
+use crate::Error;
+use core::mem::MaybeUninit;
+
+pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64};
+
+#[path = "../util_libc.rs"]
+mod util_libc;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    util_libc::sys_fill_exact(dest, |buf| unsafe {
+        libc::getrandom(buf.as_mut_ptr().cast(), buf.len(), 0)
+    })
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/hermit.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/hermit.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..34d7cdbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/hermit.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+//! Implementation for Hermit
+use crate::Error;
+use core::mem::MaybeUninit;
+
+extern "C" {
+    fn sys_read_entropy(buffer: *mut u8, length: usize, flags: u32) -> isize;
+    // Note that `sys_secure_rand32/64` are implemented using `sys_read_entropy`:
+    // https://github.com/hermit-os/kernel/blob/430da84/src/syscalls/entropy.rs#L62-L104
+    // But this may change in future and can depend on compilation target,
+    // so to future-proof we use these "syscalls".
+    fn sys_secure_rand32(value: *mut u32) -> i32;
+    fn sys_secure_rand64(value: *mut u64) -> i32;
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn inner_u32() -> Result<u32, Error> {
+    let mut res = MaybeUninit::uninit();
+    let ret = unsafe { sys_secure_rand32(res.as_mut_ptr()) };
+    match ret {
+        0 => Ok(unsafe { res.assume_init() }),
+        -1 => Err(Error::UNSUPPORTED),
+        _ => Err(Error::UNEXPECTED),
+    }
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn inner_u64() -> Result<u64, Error> {
+    let mut res = MaybeUninit::uninit();
+    let ret = unsafe { sys_secure_rand64(res.as_mut_ptr()) };
+    match ret {
+        0 => Ok(unsafe { res.assume_init() }),
+        -1 => Err(Error::UNSUPPORTED),
+        _ => Err(Error::UNEXPECTED),
+    }
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(mut dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    while !dest.is_empty() {
+        let res = unsafe { sys_read_entropy(dest.as_mut_ptr().cast::<u8>(), dest.len(), 0) };
+        match res {
+            res if res > 0 => {
+                let len = usize::try_from(res).map_err(|_| Error::UNEXPECTED)?;
+                dest = dest.get_mut(len..).ok_or(Error::UNEXPECTED)?;
+            }
+            code => {
+                let code = i32::try_from(code).map_err(|_| Error::UNEXPECTED)?;
+                return Err(Error::from_neg_error_code(code));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/linux_android_with_fallback.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/linux_android_with_fallback.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2ad8f0a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/linux_android_with_fallback.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+//! Implementation for Linux / Android with `/dev/urandom` fallback
+use super::use_file;
+use crate::Error;
+use core::{
+    ffi::c_void,
+    mem::{transmute, MaybeUninit},
+    ptr::NonNull,
+    sync::atomic::{AtomicPtr, Ordering},
+};
+use use_file::util_libc;
+
+pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64};
+
+type GetRandomFn = unsafe extern "C" fn(*mut c_void, libc::size_t, libc::c_uint) -> libc::ssize_t;
+
+/// Sentinel value which indicates that `libc::getrandom` either not available,
+/// or not supported by kernel.
+const NOT_AVAILABLE: NonNull<c_void> = unsafe { NonNull::new_unchecked(usize::MAX as *mut c_void) };
+
+static GETRANDOM_FN: AtomicPtr<c_void> = AtomicPtr::new(core::ptr::null_mut());
+
+#[cold]
+#[inline(never)]
+fn init() -> NonNull<c_void> {
+    // Use static linking to `libc::getrandom` on MUSL targets and `dlsym` everywhere else
+    #[cfg(not(target_env = "musl"))]
+    let raw_ptr = {
+        static NAME: &[u8] = b"getrandom\0";
+        let name_ptr = NAME.as_ptr().cast::<libc::c_char>();
+        unsafe { libc::dlsym(libc::RTLD_DEFAULT, name_ptr) }
+    };
+    #[cfg(target_env = "musl")]
+    let raw_ptr = {
+        let fptr: GetRandomFn = libc::getrandom;
+        unsafe { transmute::<GetRandomFn, *mut c_void>(fptr) }
+    };
+
+    let res_ptr = match NonNull::new(raw_ptr) {
+        Some(fptr) => {
+            let getrandom_fn = unsafe { transmute::<NonNull<c_void>, GetRandomFn>(fptr) };
+            let dangling_ptr = NonNull::dangling().as_ptr();
+            // Check that `getrandom` syscall is supported by kernel
+            let res = unsafe { getrandom_fn(dangling_ptr, 0, 0) };
+            if cfg!(getrandom_test_linux_fallback) {
+                NOT_AVAILABLE
+            } else if res.is_negative() {
+                match util_libc::last_os_error().raw_os_error() {
+                    Some(libc::ENOSYS) => NOT_AVAILABLE, // No kernel support
+                    // The fallback on EPERM is intentionally not done on Android since this workaround
+                    // seems to be needed only for specific Linux-based products that aren't based
+                    // on Android. See https://github.com/rust-random/getrandom/issues/229.
+                    #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
+                    Some(libc::EPERM) => NOT_AVAILABLE, // Blocked by seccomp
+                    _ => fptr,
+                }
+            } else {
+                fptr
+            }
+        }
+        None => NOT_AVAILABLE,
+    };
+
+    #[cfg(getrandom_test_linux_without_fallback)]
+    if res_ptr == NOT_AVAILABLE {
+        panic!("Fallback is triggered with enabled `getrandom_test_linux_without_fallback`")
+    }
+
+    GETRANDOM_FN.store(res_ptr.as_ptr(), Ordering::Release);
+    res_ptr
+}
+
+// Prevent inlining of the fallback implementation
+#[inline(never)]
+fn use_file_fallback(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    use_file::fill_inner(dest)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    // Despite being only a single atomic variable, we still cannot always use
+    // Ordering::Relaxed, as we need to make sure a successful call to `init`
+    // is "ordered before" any data read through the returned pointer (which
+    // occurs when the function is called). Our implementation mirrors that of
+    // the one in libstd, meaning that the use of non-Relaxed operations is
+    // probably unnecessary.
+    let raw_ptr = GETRANDOM_FN.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+    let fptr = match NonNull::new(raw_ptr) {
+        Some(p) => p,
+        None => init(),
+    };
+
+    if fptr == NOT_AVAILABLE {
+        use_file_fallback(dest)
+    } else {
+        // note: `transmute` is currently the only way to convert a pointer into a function reference
+        let getrandom_fn = unsafe { transmute::<NonNull<c_void>, GetRandomFn>(fptr) };
+        util_libc::sys_fill_exact(dest, |buf| unsafe {
+            getrandom_fn(buf.as_mut_ptr().cast(), buf.len(), 0)
+        })
+    }
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/linux_raw.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/linux_raw.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4a59eef0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/linux_raw.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+//! Implementation for Linux / Android using `asm!`-based syscalls.
+use crate::{Error, MaybeUninit};
+
+pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64};
+
+#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "android", target_os = "linux")))]
+compile_error!("`linux_raw` backend can be enabled only for Linux/Android targets!");
+
+#[allow(non_upper_case_globals)]
+unsafe fn getrandom_syscall(buf: *mut u8, buflen: usize, flags: u32) -> isize {
+    let r0;
+
+    // Based on `rustix` and `linux-raw-sys` code.
+    cfg_if! {
+        if #[cfg(target_arch = "arm")] {
+            const __NR_getrandom: u32 = 384;
+            // In thumb-mode, r7 is the frame pointer and is not permitted to be used in
+            // an inline asm operand, so we have to use a different register and copy it
+            // into r7 inside the inline asm.
+            // Theoretically, we could detect thumb mode in the build script, but several
+            // register moves are cheap enough compared to the syscall cost, so we do not
+            // bother with it.
+            core::arch::asm!(
+                "mov {tmp}, r7",
+                "mov r7, {nr}",
+                "svc 0",
+                "mov r7, {tmp}",
+                nr = const __NR_getrandom,
+                tmp = out(reg) _,
+                inlateout("r0") buf => r0,
+                in("r1") buflen,
+                in("r2") flags,
+                options(nostack, preserves_flags)
+            );
+        } else if #[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")] {
+            const __NR_getrandom: u32 = 278;
+            core::arch::asm!(
+                "svc 0",
+                in("x8") __NR_getrandom,
+                inlateout("x0") buf => r0,
+                in("x1") buflen,
+                in("x2") flags,
+                options(nostack, preserves_flags)
+            );
+        } else if #[cfg(target_arch = "loongarch64")] {
+            const __NR_getrandom: u32 = 278;
+            core::arch::asm!(
+                "syscall 0",
+                in("$a7") __NR_getrandom,
+                inlateout("$a0") buf => r0,
+                in("$a1") buflen,
+                in("$a2") flags,
+                options(nostack, preserves_flags)
+            );
+        } else if #[cfg(any(target_arch = "riscv32", target_arch = "riscv64"))] {
+            const __NR_getrandom: u32 = 278;
+            core::arch::asm!(
+                "ecall",
+                in("a7") __NR_getrandom,
+                inlateout("a0") buf => r0,
+                in("a1") buflen,
+                in("a2") flags,
+                options(nostack, preserves_flags)
+            );
+        } else if #[cfg(target_arch = "s390x")] {
+            const __NR_getrandom: u32 = 349;
+            core::arch::asm!(
+                "svc 0",
+                in("r1") __NR_getrandom,
+                inlateout("r2") buf => r0,
+                in("r3") buflen,
+                in("r4") flags,
+                options(nostack, preserves_flags)
+            );
+        } else if #[cfg(target_arch = "x86")] {
+            const __NR_getrandom: u32 = 355;
+            // `int 0x80` is famously slow, but implementing vDSO is too complex
+            // and `sysenter`/`syscall` have their own portability issues,
+            // so we use the simple "legacy" way of doing syscalls.
+            core::arch::asm!(
+                "int $$0x80",
+                in("eax") __NR_getrandom,
+                in("ebx") buf,
+                in("ecx") buflen,
+                in("edx") flags,
+                lateout("eax") r0,
+                options(nostack, preserves_flags)
+            );
+        } else if #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] {
+            #[cfg(target_pointer_width = "64")]
+            const __NR_getrandom: u32 = 318;
+            #[cfg(target_pointer_width = "32")]
+            const __NR_getrandom: u32 = (1 << 30) + 318;
+
+            core::arch::asm!(
+                "syscall",
+                in("rax") __NR_getrandom,
+                in("rdi") buf,
+                in("rsi") buflen,
+                in("rdx") flags,
+                lateout("rax") r0,
+                lateout("rcx") _,
+                lateout("r11") _,
+                options(nostack, preserves_flags)
+            );
+        } else {
+            compile_error!("`linux_raw` backend does not support this target arch");
+        }
+    }
+
+    r0
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(mut dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    // Value of this error code is stable across all target arches.
+    const EINTR: isize = -4;
+
+    loop {
+        let ret = unsafe { getrandom_syscall(dest.as_mut_ptr().cast(), dest.len(), 0) };
+        match usize::try_from(ret) {
+            Ok(0) => return Err(Error::UNEXPECTED),
+            Ok(len) => {
+                dest = dest.get_mut(len..).ok_or(Error::UNEXPECTED)?;
+                if dest.is_empty() {
+                    return Ok(());
+                }
+            }
+            Err(_) if ret == EINTR => continue,
+            Err(_) => {
+                let code = i32::try_from(ret).map_err(|_| Error::UNEXPECTED)?;
+                return Err(Error::from_neg_error_code(code));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/netbsd.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/netbsd.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f228a8b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/netbsd.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+//! Implementation for NetBSD
+//!
+//! `getrandom(2)` was introduced in NetBSD 10. To support older versions we
+//! implement our own weak linkage to it, and provide a fallback based on the
+//! KERN_ARND sysctl.
+use crate::Error;
+use core::{
+    cmp,
+    ffi::c_void,
+    mem::{self, MaybeUninit},
+    ptr,
+    sync::atomic::{AtomicPtr, Ordering},
+};
+
+pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64};
+
+#[path = "../util_libc.rs"]
+mod util_libc;
+
+unsafe extern "C" fn polyfill_using_kern_arand(
+    buf: *mut c_void,
+    buflen: libc::size_t,
+    flags: libc::c_uint,
+) -> libc::ssize_t {
+    debug_assert_eq!(flags, 0);
+
+    const MIB_LEN: libc::c_uint = 2;
+    static MIB: [libc::c_int; MIB_LEN as usize] = [libc::CTL_KERN, libc::KERN_ARND];
+
+    // NetBSD will only return up to 256 bytes at a time, and
+    // older NetBSD kernels will fail on longer buffers.
+    let mut len = cmp::min(buflen, 256);
+    let ret = unsafe { libc::sysctl(MIB.as_ptr(), MIB_LEN, buf, &mut len, ptr::null(), 0) };
+
+    match ret {
+        0 if len <= 256 => libc::ssize_t::try_from(len).expect("len is in the range of 0..=256"),
+        -1 => -1,
+        // Zero return result will be converted into `Error::UNEXPECTED` by `sys_fill_exact`
+        _ => 0,
+    }
+}
+
+type GetRandomFn = unsafe extern "C" fn(*mut c_void, libc::size_t, libc::c_uint) -> libc::ssize_t;
+
+static GETRANDOM: AtomicPtr<c_void> = AtomicPtr::new(ptr::null_mut());
+
+#[cold]
+#[inline(never)]
+fn init() -> *mut c_void {
+    static NAME: &[u8] = b"getrandom\0";
+    let name_ptr = NAME.as_ptr().cast::<libc::c_char>();
+    let mut ptr = unsafe { libc::dlsym(libc::RTLD_DEFAULT, name_ptr) };
+    if ptr.is_null() || cfg!(getrandom_test_netbsd_fallback) {
+        // Verify `polyfill_using_kern_arand` has the right signature.
+        const POLYFILL: GetRandomFn = polyfill_using_kern_arand;
+        ptr = POLYFILL as *mut c_void;
+    }
+    GETRANDOM.store(ptr, Ordering::Release);
+    ptr
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    // Despite being only a single atomic variable, we still cannot always use
+    // Ordering::Relaxed, as we need to make sure a successful call to `init`
+    // is "ordered before" any data read through the returned pointer (which
+    // occurs when the function is called). Our implementation mirrors that of
+    // the one in libstd, meaning that the use of non-Relaxed operations is
+    // probably unnecessary.
+    let mut fptr = GETRANDOM.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+    if fptr.is_null() {
+        fptr = init();
+    }
+    let fptr = unsafe { mem::transmute::<*mut c_void, GetRandomFn>(fptr) };
+    util_libc::sys_fill_exact(dest, |buf| unsafe {
+        fptr(buf.as_mut_ptr().cast::<c_void>(), buf.len(), 0)
+    })
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/rdrand.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/rdrand.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..609fcc38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/rdrand.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+//! RDRAND backend for x86(-64) targets
+use crate::{util::slice_as_uninit, Error};
+use core::mem::{size_of, MaybeUninit};
+
+#[path = "../lazy.rs"]
+mod lazy;
+
+#[cfg(not(any(target_arch = "x86_64", target_arch = "x86")))]
+compile_error!("`rdrand` backend can be enabled only for x86 and x86-64 targets!");
+
+cfg_if! {
+    if #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] {
+        use core::arch::x86_64 as arch;
+        use arch::_rdrand64_step as rdrand_step;
+        type Word = u64;
+    } else if #[cfg(target_arch = "x86")] {
+        use core::arch::x86 as arch;
+        use arch::_rdrand32_step as rdrand_step;
+        type Word = u32;
+    }
+}
+
+static RDRAND_GOOD: lazy::LazyBool = lazy::LazyBool::new();
+
+// Recommendation from "Intel® Digital Random Number Generator (DRNG) Software
+// Implementation Guide" - Section 5.2.1 and "Intel® 64 and IA-32 Architectures
+// Software Developer’s Manual" - Volume 1 - Section 7.3.17.1.
+const RETRY_LIMIT: usize = 10;
+
+#[target_feature(enable = "rdrand")]
+unsafe fn rdrand() -> Option<Word> {
+    for _ in 0..RETRY_LIMIT {
+        let mut val = 0;
+        if rdrand_step(&mut val) == 1 {
+            return Some(val);
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+// "rdrand" target feature requires "+rdrand" flag, see https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/49653.
+#[cfg(all(target_env = "sgx", not(target_feature = "rdrand")))]
+compile_error!(
+    "SGX targets require 'rdrand' target feature. Enable by using -C target-feature=+rdrand."
+);
+
+// Run a small self-test to make sure we aren't repeating values
+// Adapted from Linux's test in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c
+// Fails with probability < 2^(-90) on 32-bit systems
+#[target_feature(enable = "rdrand")]
+unsafe fn self_test() -> bool {
+    // On AMD, RDRAND returns 0xFF...FF on failure, count it as a collision.
+    let mut prev = !0; // TODO(MSRV 1.43): Move to usize::MAX
+    let mut fails = 0;
+    for _ in 0..8 {
+        match rdrand() {
+            Some(val) if val == prev => fails += 1,
+            Some(val) => prev = val,
+            None => return false,
+        };
+    }
+    fails <= 2
+}
+
+fn is_rdrand_good() -> bool {
+    #[cfg(not(target_feature = "rdrand"))]
+    {
+        // SAFETY: All Rust x86 targets are new enough to have CPUID, and we
+        // check that leaf 1 is supported before using it.
+        let cpuid0 = unsafe { arch::__cpuid(0) };
+        if cpuid0.eax < 1 {
+            return false;
+        }
+        let cpuid1 = unsafe { arch::__cpuid(1) };
+
+        let vendor_id = [
+            cpuid0.ebx.to_le_bytes(),
+            cpuid0.edx.to_le_bytes(),
+            cpuid0.ecx.to_le_bytes(),
+        ];
+        if vendor_id == [*b"Auth", *b"enti", *b"cAMD"] {
+            let mut family = (cpuid1.eax >> 8) & 0xF;
+            if family == 0xF {
+                family += (cpuid1.eax >> 20) & 0xFF;
+            }
+            // AMD CPUs families before 17h (Zen) sometimes fail to set CF when
+            // RDRAND fails after suspend. Don't use RDRAND on those families.
+            // See https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1150286
+            if family < 0x17 {
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+
+        const RDRAND_FLAG: u32 = 1 << 30;
+        if cpuid1.ecx & RDRAND_FLAG == 0 {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // SAFETY: We have already checked that rdrand is available.
+    unsafe { self_test() }
+}
+
+// TODO: make this function safe when we have feature(target_feature_11)
+#[target_feature(enable = "rdrand")]
+unsafe fn rdrand_exact(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Option<()> {
+    // We use chunks_exact_mut instead of chunks_mut as it allows almost all
+    // calls to memcpy to be elided by the compiler.
+    let mut chunks = dest.chunks_exact_mut(size_of::<Word>());
+    for chunk in chunks.by_ref() {
+        let src = rdrand()?.to_ne_bytes();
+        chunk.copy_from_slice(slice_as_uninit(&src));
+    }
+
+    let tail = chunks.into_remainder();
+    let n = tail.len();
+    if n > 0 {
+        let src = rdrand()?.to_ne_bytes();
+        tail.copy_from_slice(slice_as_uninit(&src[..n]));
+    }
+    Some(())
+}
+
+#[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")]
+#[target_feature(enable = "rdrand")]
+unsafe fn rdrand_u32() -> Option<u32> {
+    rdrand().map(crate::util::truncate)
+}
+
+#[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")]
+#[target_feature(enable = "rdrand")]
+unsafe fn rdrand_u64() -> Option<u64> {
+    rdrand()
+}
+
+#[cfg(target_arch = "x86")]
+#[target_feature(enable = "rdrand")]
+unsafe fn rdrand_u32() -> Option<u32> {
+    rdrand()
+}
+
+#[cfg(target_arch = "x86")]
+#[target_feature(enable = "rdrand")]
+unsafe fn rdrand_u64() -> Option<u64> {
+    let a = rdrand()?;
+    let b = rdrand()?;
+    Some((u64::from(a) << 32) | u64::from(b))
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn inner_u32() -> Result<u32, Error> {
+    if !RDRAND_GOOD.unsync_init(is_rdrand_good) {
+        return Err(Error::NO_RDRAND);
+    }
+    // SAFETY: After this point, we know rdrand is supported.
+    unsafe { rdrand_u32() }.ok_or(Error::FAILED_RDRAND)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn inner_u64() -> Result<u64, Error> {
+    if !RDRAND_GOOD.unsync_init(is_rdrand_good) {
+        return Err(Error::NO_RDRAND);
+    }
+    // SAFETY: After this point, we know rdrand is supported.
+    unsafe { rdrand_u64() }.ok_or(Error::FAILED_RDRAND)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    if !RDRAND_GOOD.unsync_init(is_rdrand_good) {
+        return Err(Error::NO_RDRAND);
+    }
+    // SAFETY: After this point, we know rdrand is supported.
+    unsafe { rdrand_exact(dest) }.ok_or(Error::FAILED_RDRAND)
+}
+
+impl Error {
+    /// RDRAND instruction failed due to a hardware issue.
+    pub(crate) const FAILED_RDRAND: Error = Self::new_internal(10);
+    /// RDRAND instruction unsupported on this target.
+    pub(crate) const NO_RDRAND: Error = Self::new_internal(11);
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/rndr.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/rndr.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..eea741a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/rndr.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+//! RNDR register backend for aarch64 targets
+//!
+//! Arm Architecture Reference Manual for A-profile architecture:
+//! ARM DDI 0487K.a, ID032224, D23.2.147 RNDR, Random Number
+use crate::{
+    util::{slice_as_uninit, truncate},
+    Error,
+};
+use core::arch::asm;
+use core::mem::{size_of, MaybeUninit};
+
+#[cfg(not(target_arch = "aarch64"))]
+compile_error!("the `rndr` backend can be enabled only for AArch64 targets!");
+
+const RETRY_LIMIT: usize = 5;
+
+/// Read a random number from the aarch64 RNDR register
+///
+/// Callers must ensure that FEAT_RNG is available on the system
+/// The function assumes that the RNDR register is available
+/// If it fails to read a random number, it will retry up to 5 times
+/// After 5 failed reads the function will return `None`
+#[target_feature(enable = "rand")]
+unsafe fn rndr() -> Option<u64> {
+    for _ in 0..RETRY_LIMIT {
+        let mut x: u64;
+        let mut nzcv: u64;
+
+        // AArch64 RNDR register is accessible by s3_3_c2_c4_0
+        asm!(
+            "mrs {x}, RNDR",
+            "mrs {nzcv}, NZCV",
+            x = out(reg) x,
+            nzcv = out(reg) nzcv,
+        );
+
+        // If the hardware returns a genuine random number, PSTATE.NZCV is set to 0b0000
+        if nzcv == 0 {
+            return Some(x);
+        }
+    }
+
+    None
+}
+
+#[target_feature(enable = "rand")]
+unsafe fn rndr_fill(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Option<()> {
+    let mut chunks = dest.chunks_exact_mut(size_of::<u64>());
+    for chunk in chunks.by_ref() {
+        let src = rndr()?.to_ne_bytes();
+        chunk.copy_from_slice(slice_as_uninit(&src));
+    }
+
+    let tail = chunks.into_remainder();
+    let n = tail.len();
+    if n > 0 {
+        let src = rndr()?.to_ne_bytes();
+        tail.copy_from_slice(slice_as_uninit(&src[..n]));
+    }
+    Some(())
+}
+
+#[cfg(target_feature = "rand")]
+fn is_rndr_available() -> bool {
+    true
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(target_feature = "rand"))]
+fn is_rndr_available() -> bool {
+    #[path = "../lazy.rs"]
+    mod lazy;
+    static RNDR_GOOD: lazy::LazyBool = lazy::LazyBool::new();
+
+    cfg_if::cfg_if! {
+        if #[cfg(feature = "std")] {
+            extern crate std;
+            RNDR_GOOD.unsync_init(|| std::arch::is_aarch64_feature_detected!("rand"))
+        } else if #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] {
+            /// Check whether FEAT_RNG is available on the system
+            ///
+            /// Requires the caller either be running in EL1 or be on a system supporting MRS
+            /// emulation. Due to the above, the implementation is currently restricted to Linux.
+            ///
+            /// Relying on runtime detection bumps minimum supported Linux kernel version to 4.11.
+            fn mrs_check() -> bool {
+                let mut id_aa64isar0: u64;
+
+                // If FEAT_RNG is implemented, ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1.RNDR (bits 60-63) are 0b0001
+                // This is okay to do from EL0 in Linux because Linux will emulate MRS as per
+                // https://docs.kernel.org/arch/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.html
+                unsafe {
+                    asm!(
+                        "mrs {id}, ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1",
+                        id = out(reg) id_aa64isar0,
+                    );
+                }
+
+                (id_aa64isar0 >> 60) & 0xf >= 1
+            }
+
+            RNDR_GOOD.unsync_init(mrs_check)
+        } else {
+            compile_error!(
+                "RNDR `no_std` runtime detection is currently supported only on Linux targets. \
+                Either enable the `std` crate feature, or `rand` target feature at compile time."
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn inner_u32() -> Result<u32, Error> {
+    if !is_rndr_available() {
+        return Err(Error::RNDR_NOT_AVAILABLE);
+    }
+    // SAFETY: after this point, we know the `rand` target feature is enabled
+    let res = unsafe { rndr() };
+    res.map(truncate).ok_or(Error::RNDR_FAILURE)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn inner_u64() -> Result<u64, Error> {
+    if !is_rndr_available() {
+        return Err(Error::RNDR_NOT_AVAILABLE);
+    }
+    // SAFETY: after this point, we know the `rand` target feature is enabled
+    let res = unsafe { rndr() };
+    res.ok_or(Error::RNDR_FAILURE)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    if !is_rndr_available() {
+        return Err(Error::RNDR_NOT_AVAILABLE);
+    }
+    // SAFETY: after this point, we know the `rand` target feature is enabled
+    unsafe { rndr_fill(dest).ok_or(Error::RNDR_FAILURE) }
+}
+
+impl Error {
+    /// RNDR register read failed due to a hardware issue.
+    pub(crate) const RNDR_FAILURE: Error = Self::new_internal(10);
+    /// RNDR register is not supported on this target.
+    pub(crate) const RNDR_NOT_AVAILABLE: Error = Self::new_internal(11);
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/solaris.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/solaris.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c27f91a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/solaris.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+//! Solaris implementation using getrandom(2).
+//!
+//! While getrandom(2) has been available since Solaris 11.3, it has a few
+//! quirks not present on other OSes. First, on Solaris 11.3, calls will always
+//! fail if bufsz > 1024. Second, it will always either fail or completely fill
+//! the buffer (returning bufsz). Third, error is indicated by returning 0,
+//! rather than by returning -1. Finally, "if GRND_RANDOM is not specified
+//! then getrandom(2) is always a non blocking call". This _might_ imply that
+//! in early-boot scenarios with low entropy, getrandom(2) will not properly
+//! block. To be safe, we set GRND_RANDOM, mirroring the man page examples.
+//!
+//! For more information, see the man page linked in lib.rs and this blog post:
+//! https://blogs.oracle.com/solaris/post/solaris-new-system-calls-getentropy2-and-getrandom2
+//! which also explains why this crate should not use getentropy(2).
+use crate::Error;
+use core::{ffi::c_void, mem::MaybeUninit};
+
+pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64};
+
+#[path = "../util_libc.rs"]
+mod util_libc;
+
+const MAX_BYTES: usize = 1024;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    for chunk in dest.chunks_mut(MAX_BYTES) {
+        let ptr = chunk.as_mut_ptr().cast::<c_void>();
+        let ret = unsafe { libc::getrandom(ptr, chunk.len(), libc::GRND_RANDOM) };
+        // In case the man page has a typo, we also check for negative ret.
+        // If getrandom(2) succeeds, it should have completely filled chunk.
+        match usize::try_from(ret) {
+            // Good. Keep going.
+            Ok(ret) if ret == chunk.len() => {}
+            // The syscall failed.
+            Ok(0) => return Err(util_libc::last_os_error()),
+            // All other cases should be impossible.
+            _ => return Err(Error::UNEXPECTED),
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/solid.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/solid.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..caa773f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/solid.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+//! Implementation for SOLID
+use crate::Error;
+use core::mem::MaybeUninit;
+
+pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64};
+
+extern "C" {
+    pub fn SOLID_RNG_SampleRandomBytes(buffer: *mut u8, length: usize) -> i32;
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    let ret = unsafe { SOLID_RNG_SampleRandomBytes(dest.as_mut_ptr().cast::<u8>(), dest.len()) };
+    if ret >= 0 {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        Err(Error::from_neg_error_code(ret))
+    }
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/use_file.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/use_file.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7b48d433
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/use_file.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+//! Implementations that just need to read from a file
+use crate::Error;
+use core::{
+    ffi::c_void,
+    mem::MaybeUninit,
+    sync::atomic::{AtomicI32, Ordering},
+};
+
+#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "android", target_os = "linux")))]
+pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64};
+
+#[path = "../util_libc.rs"]
+pub(super) mod util_libc;
+
+/// For all platforms, we use `/dev/urandom` rather than `/dev/random`.
+/// For more information see the linked man pages in lib.rs.
+///   - On Linux, "/dev/urandom is preferred and sufficient in all use cases".
+///   - On Redox, only /dev/urandom is provided.
+///   - On AIX, /dev/urandom will "provide cryptographically secure output".
+///   - On Haiku and QNX Neutrino they are identical.
+const FILE_PATH: &[u8] = b"/dev/urandom\0";
+
+// File descriptor is a "nonnegative integer", so we can safely use negative sentinel values.
+const FD_UNINIT: libc::c_int = -1;
+const FD_ONGOING_INIT: libc::c_int = -2;
+
+// In theory `libc::c_int` could be something other than `i32`, but for the
+// targets we currently support that use `use_file`, it is always `i32`.
+// If/when we add support for a target where that isn't the case, we may
+// need to use a different atomic type or make other accomodations. The
+// compiler will let us know if/when that is the case, because the
+// `FD.store(fd)` would fail to compile.
+//
+// The opening of the file, by libc/libstd/etc. may write some unknown
+// state into in-process memory. (Such state may include some sanitizer
+// bookkeeping, or we might be operating in a unikernal-like environment
+// where all the "kernel" file descriptor bookkeeping is done in our
+// process.) `get_fd_locked` stores into FD using `Ordering::Release` to
+// ensure any such state is synchronized. `get_fd` loads from `FD` with
+// `Ordering::Acquire` to synchronize with it.
+static FD: AtomicI32 = AtomicI32::new(FD_UNINIT);
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    let mut fd = FD.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+    if fd == FD_UNINIT || fd == FD_ONGOING_INIT {
+        fd = open_or_wait()?;
+    }
+    util_libc::sys_fill_exact(dest, |buf| unsafe {
+        libc::read(fd, buf.as_mut_ptr().cast::<c_void>(), buf.len())
+    })
+}
+
+/// Open a file in read-only mode.
+///
+/// # Panics
+/// If `path` does not contain any zeros.
+// TODO: Move `path` to `CStr` and use `CStr::from_bytes_until_nul` (MSRV 1.69)
+// or C-string literals (MSRV 1.77) for statics
+fn open_readonly(path: &[u8]) -> Result<libc::c_int, Error> {
+    assert!(path.contains(&0));
+    loop {
+        let fd = unsafe {
+            libc::open(
+                path.as_ptr().cast::<libc::c_char>(),
+                libc::O_RDONLY | libc::O_CLOEXEC,
+            )
+        };
+        if fd >= 0 {
+            return Ok(fd);
+        }
+        let err = util_libc::last_os_error();
+        // We should try again if open() was interrupted.
+        if err.raw_os_error() != Some(libc::EINTR) {
+            return Err(err);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cold]
+#[inline(never)]
+fn open_or_wait() -> Result<libc::c_int, Error> {
+    loop {
+        match FD.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
+            FD_UNINIT => {
+                let res = FD.compare_exchange_weak(
+                    FD_UNINIT,
+                    FD_ONGOING_INIT,
+                    Ordering::AcqRel,
+                    Ordering::Relaxed,
+                );
+                if res.is_ok() {
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+            FD_ONGOING_INIT => sync::wait(),
+            fd => return Ok(fd),
+        }
+    }
+
+    let res = open_fd();
+    let val = match res {
+        Ok(fd) => fd,
+        Err(_) => FD_UNINIT,
+    };
+    FD.store(val, Ordering::Release);
+
+    // On non-Linux targets `wait` is just 1 ms sleep,
+    // so we don't need any explicit wake up in addition
+    // to updating value of `FD`.
+    #[cfg(any(target_os = "android", target_os = "linux"))]
+    sync::wake();
+
+    res
+}
+
+fn open_fd() -> Result<libc::c_int, Error> {
+    #[cfg(any(target_os = "android", target_os = "linux"))]
+    sync::wait_until_rng_ready()?;
+    let fd = open_readonly(FILE_PATH)?;
+    debug_assert!(fd >= 0);
+    Ok(fd)
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "android", target_os = "linux")))]
+mod sync {
+    /// Sleep 1 ms before checking `FD` again.
+    ///
+    /// On non-Linux targets the critical section only opens file,
+    /// which should not block, so in the unlikely contended case,
+    /// we can sleep-wait for the opening operation to finish.
+    pub(super) fn wait() {
+        let rqtp = libc::timespec {
+            tv_sec: 0,
+            tv_nsec: 1_000_000,
+        };
+        let mut rmtp = libc::timespec {
+            tv_sec: 0,
+            tv_nsec: 0,
+        };
+        // We do not care if sleep gets interrupted, so the return value is ignored
+        unsafe {
+            libc::nanosleep(&rqtp, &mut rmtp);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(any(target_os = "android", target_os = "linux"))]
+mod sync {
+    use super::{open_readonly, util_libc::last_os_error, Error, FD, FD_ONGOING_INIT};
+
+    /// Wait for atomic `FD` to change value from `FD_ONGOING_INIT` to something else.
+    ///
+    /// Futex syscall with `FUTEX_WAIT` op puts the current thread to sleep
+    /// until futex syscall with `FUTEX_WAKE` op gets executed for `FD`.
+    ///
+    /// For more information read: https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/futex.2.html
+    pub(super) fn wait() {
+        let op = libc::FUTEX_WAIT | libc::FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG;
+        let timeout_ptr = core::ptr::null::<libc::timespec>();
+        let ret = unsafe { libc::syscall(libc::SYS_futex, &FD, op, FD_ONGOING_INIT, timeout_ptr) };
+        // FUTEX_WAIT should return either 0 or EAGAIN error
+        debug_assert!({
+            match ret {
+                0 => true,
+                -1 => last_os_error().raw_os_error() == Some(libc::EAGAIN),
+                _ => false,
+            }
+        });
+    }
+
+    /// Wake up all threads which wait for value of atomic `FD` to change.
+    pub(super) fn wake() {
+        let op = libc::FUTEX_WAKE | libc::FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG;
+        let ret = unsafe { libc::syscall(libc::SYS_futex, &FD, op, libc::INT_MAX) };
+        debug_assert!(ret >= 0);
+    }
+
+    // Polls /dev/random to make sure it is ok to read from /dev/urandom.
+    //
+    // Polling avoids draining the estimated entropy from /dev/random;
+    // short-lived processes reading even a single byte from /dev/random could
+    // be problematic if they are being executed faster than entropy is being
+    // collected.
+    //
+    // OTOH, reading a byte instead of polling is more compatible with
+    // sandboxes that disallow `poll()` but which allow reading /dev/random,
+    // e.g. sandboxes that assume that `poll()` is for network I/O. This way,
+    // fewer applications will have to insert pre-sandbox-initialization logic.
+    // Often (blocking) file I/O is not allowed in such early phases of an
+    // application for performance and/or security reasons.
+    //
+    // It is hard to write a sandbox policy to support `libc::poll()` because
+    // it may invoke the `poll`, `ppoll`, `ppoll_time64` (since Linux 5.1, with
+    // newer versions of glibc), and/or (rarely, and probably only on ancient
+    // systems) `select`. depending on the libc implementation (e.g. glibc vs
+    // musl), libc version, potentially the kernel version at runtime, and/or
+    // the target architecture.
+    //
+    // BoringSSL and libstd don't try to protect against insecure output from
+    // `/dev/urandom'; they don't open `/dev/random` at all.
+    //
+    // OpenSSL uses `libc::select()` unless the `dev/random` file descriptor
+    // is too large; if it is too large then it does what we do here.
+    //
+    // libsodium uses `libc::poll` similarly to this.
+    pub(super) fn wait_until_rng_ready() -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let fd = open_readonly(b"/dev/random\0")?;
+        let mut pfd = libc::pollfd {
+            fd,
+            events: libc::POLLIN,
+            revents: 0,
+        };
+
+        let res = loop {
+            // A negative timeout means an infinite timeout.
+            let res = unsafe { libc::poll(&mut pfd, 1, -1) };
+            if res >= 0 {
+                // We only used one fd, and cannot timeout.
+                debug_assert_eq!(res, 1);
+                break Ok(());
+            }
+            let err = last_os_error();
+            // Assuming that `poll` is called correctly,
+            // on Linux it can return only EINTR and ENOMEM errors.
+            match err.raw_os_error() {
+                Some(libc::EINTR) => continue,
+                _ => break Err(err),
+            }
+        };
+        unsafe { libc::close(fd) };
+        res
+    }
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/vxworks.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/vxworks.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5f5e6773
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/vxworks.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+//! Implementation for VxWorks
+use crate::Error;
+use core::{
+    cmp::Ordering::{Equal, Greater, Less},
+    mem::MaybeUninit,
+    sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering::Relaxed},
+};
+
+#[path = "../util_libc.rs"]
+mod util_libc;
+
+pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64};
+
+static RNG_INIT: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(false);
+
+#[cold]
+fn init() -> Result<(), Error> {
+    let ret = unsafe { libc::randSecure() };
+    match ret.cmp(&0) {
+        Greater => RNG_INIT.store(true, Relaxed),
+        Equal => unsafe {
+            libc::usleep(10);
+        },
+        Less => return Err(Error::VXWORKS_RAND_SECURE),
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    while !RNG_INIT.load(Relaxed) {
+        init()?;
+    }
+
+    // Prevent overflow of i32
+    let chunk_size = usize::try_from(i32::MAX).expect("VxWorks does not support 16-bit targets");
+    for chunk in dest.chunks_mut(chunk_size) {
+        let chunk_len: libc::c_int = chunk
+            .len()
+            .try_into()
+            .expect("chunk size is bounded by i32::MAX");
+        let p: *mut libc::c_uchar = chunk.as_mut_ptr().cast();
+        let ret = unsafe { libc::randABytes(p, chunk_len) };
+        if ret != 0 {
+            return Err(util_libc::last_os_error());
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+impl Error {
+    /// On VxWorks, call to `randSecure` failed (random number generator is not yet initialized).
+    pub(crate) const VXWORKS_RAND_SECURE: Error = Self::new_internal(10);
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/wasi_p1.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/wasi_p1.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..25b5ca3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/wasi_p1.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+//! Implementation for WASI Preview 1
+use crate::Error;
+use core::mem::MaybeUninit;
+
+pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64};
+
+// This linking is vendored from the wasi crate:
+// https://docs.rs/wasi/0.11.0+wasi-snapshot-preview1/src/wasi/lib_generated.rs.html#2344-2350
+#[link(wasm_import_module = "wasi_snapshot_preview1")]
+extern "C" {
+    fn random_get(arg0: i32, arg1: i32) -> i32;
+}
+
+/// WASI p1 uses `u16` for error codes in its witx definitions:
+/// https://github.com/WebAssembly/WASI/blob/38454e9e/legacy/preview1/witx/typenames.witx#L34-L39
+const MAX_ERROR_CODE: i32 = u16::MAX as i32;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    // Based on the wasi code:
+    // https://docs.rs/wasi/0.11.0+wasi-snapshot-preview1/src/wasi/lib_generated.rs.html#2046-2062
+    // Note that size of an allocated object can not be bigger than isize::MAX bytes.
+    // WASI 0.1 supports only 32-bit WASM, so casting length to `i32` is safe.
+    #[allow(clippy::cast_possible_truncation, clippy::cast_possible_wrap)]
+    let ret = unsafe { random_get(dest.as_mut_ptr() as i32, dest.len() as i32) };
+    match ret {
+        0 => Ok(()),
+        // WASI functions should return positive error codes which are smaller than `MAX_ERROR_CODE`
+        code if code <= MAX_ERROR_CODE => Err(Error::from_neg_error_code(-code)),
+        _ => Err(Error::UNEXPECTED),
+    }
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/wasi_p2.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/wasi_p2.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..63bd2d7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/wasi_p2.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+//! Implementation for WASI Preview 2.
+use crate::Error;
+use core::mem::MaybeUninit;
+use wasi::random::random::get_random_u64;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn inner_u32() -> Result<u32, Error> {
+    let val = get_random_u64();
+    Ok(crate::util::truncate(val))
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn inner_u64() -> Result<u64, Error> {
+    Ok(get_random_u64())
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    use core::ptr::copy_nonoverlapping;
+    use wasi::random::random::get_random_u64;
+
+    let (prefix, chunks, suffix) = unsafe { dest.align_to_mut::<MaybeUninit<u64>>() };
+
+    // We use `get_random_u64` instead of `get_random_bytes` because the latter creates
+    // an allocation due to the Wit IDL [restrictions][0]. This should be fine since
+    // the main use case of `getrandom` is seed generation.
+    //
+    // [0]: https://github.com/WebAssembly/wasi-random/issues/27
+    if !prefix.is_empty() {
+        let val = get_random_u64();
+        let src = (&val as *const u64).cast();
+        unsafe {
+            copy_nonoverlapping(src, prefix.as_mut_ptr(), prefix.len());
+        }
+    }
+
+    for dst in chunks {
+        dst.write(get_random_u64());
+    }
+
+    if !suffix.is_empty() {
+        let val = get_random_u64();
+        let src = (&val as *const u64).cast();
+        unsafe {
+            copy_nonoverlapping(src, suffix.as_mut_ptr(), suffix.len());
+        }
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/wasm_js.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/wasm_js.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1320d9fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/wasm_js.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+//! Implementation for WASM based on Web and Node.js
+use crate::Error;
+use core::mem::MaybeUninit;
+
+pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64};
+
+#[cfg(not(all(target_arch = "wasm32", any(target_os = "unknown", target_os = "none"))))]
+compile_error!("`wasm_js` backend can be enabled only for OS-less WASM targets!");
+
+use wasm_bindgen::{prelude::wasm_bindgen, JsValue};
+
+// Maximum buffer size allowed in `Crypto.getRandomValuesSize` is 65536 bytes.
+// See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Crypto/getRandomValues
+const MAX_BUFFER_SIZE: usize = 65536;
+
+#[cfg(not(target_feature = "atomics"))]
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    for chunk in dest.chunks_mut(MAX_BUFFER_SIZE) {
+        if get_random_values(chunk).is_err() {
+            return Err(Error::WEB_CRYPTO);
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[cfg(target_feature = "atomics")]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    // getRandomValues does not work with all types of WASM memory,
+    // so we initially write to browser memory to avoid exceptions.
+    let buf_len = usize::min(dest.len(), MAX_BUFFER_SIZE);
+    let buf_len_u32 = buf_len
+        .try_into()
+        .expect("buffer length is bounded by MAX_BUFFER_SIZE");
+    let buf = js_sys::Uint8Array::new_with_length(buf_len_u32);
+    for chunk in dest.chunks_mut(buf_len) {
+        let chunk_len = chunk
+            .len()
+            .try_into()
+            .expect("chunk length is bounded by MAX_BUFFER_SIZE");
+        // The chunk can be smaller than buf's length, so we call to
+        // JS to create a smaller view of buf without allocation.
+        let sub_buf = if chunk_len == buf_len_u32 {
+            &buf
+        } else {
+            &buf.subarray(0, chunk_len)
+        };
+
+        if get_random_values(sub_buf).is_err() {
+            return Err(Error::WEB_CRYPTO);
+        }
+
+        sub_buf.copy_to_uninit(chunk);
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[wasm_bindgen]
+extern "C" {
+    // Crypto.getRandomValues()
+    #[cfg(not(target_feature = "atomics"))]
+    #[wasm_bindgen(js_namespace = ["globalThis", "crypto"], js_name = getRandomValues, catch)]
+    fn get_random_values(buf: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), JsValue>;
+    #[cfg(target_feature = "atomics")]
+    #[wasm_bindgen(js_namespace = ["globalThis", "crypto"], js_name = getRandomValues, catch)]
+    fn get_random_values(buf: &js_sys::Uint8Array) -> Result<(), JsValue>;
+}
+
+impl Error {
+    /// The environment does not support the Web Crypto API.
+    pub(crate) const WEB_CRYPTO: Error = Self::new_internal(10);
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/windows.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/windows.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b5cd504f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/windows.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+//! Implementation for Windows 10 and later
+//!
+//! On Windows 10 and later, ProcessPrng "is the primary interface to the
+//! user-mode per-processor PRNGs" and only requires bcryptprimitives.dll,
+//! making it a better option than the other Windows RNG APIs:
+//!   - BCryptGenRandom: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptgenrandom
+//!     - Requires bcrypt.dll (which loads bcryptprimitives.dll anyway)
+//!     - Can cause crashes/hangs as BCrypt accesses the Windows Registry:
+//!       https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/99341
+//!     - Causes issues inside sandboxed code:
+//!       https://issues.chromium.org/issues/40277768
+//!   - CryptGenRandom: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincrypt/nf-wincrypt-cryptgenrandom
+//!     - Deprecated and not available on UWP targets
+//!     - Requires advapi32.lib/advapi32.dll (in addition to bcryptprimitives.dll)
+//!     - Thin wrapper around ProcessPrng
+//!   - RtlGenRandom: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ntsecapi/nf-ntsecapi-rtlgenrandom
+//!     - Deprecated and not available on UWP targets
+//!     - Requires advapi32.dll (in addition to bcryptprimitives.dll)
+//!     - Requires using name "SystemFunction036"
+//!     - Thin wrapper around ProcessPrng
+//!
+//! For more information see the Windows RNG Whitepaper: https://aka.ms/win10rng
+use crate::Error;
+use core::mem::MaybeUninit;
+
+pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64};
+
+// Binding to the Windows.Win32.Security.Cryptography.ProcessPrng API. As
+// bcryptprimitives.dll lacks an import library, we use "raw-dylib". This
+// was added in Rust 1.65 for x86_64/aarch64 and in Rust 1.71 for x86.
+// We don't need MSRV 1.71, as we only use this backend on Rust 1.78 and later.
+#[cfg_attr(
+    target_arch = "x86",
+    link(
+        name = "bcryptprimitives",
+        kind = "raw-dylib",
+        import_name_type = "undecorated"
+    )
+)]
+#[cfg_attr(
+    not(target_arch = "x86"),
+    link(name = "bcryptprimitives", kind = "raw-dylib")
+)]
+extern "system" {
+    fn ProcessPrng(pbdata: *mut u8, cbdata: usize) -> BOOL;
+}
+#[allow(clippy::upper_case_acronyms)]
+type BOOL = core::ffi::c_int; // MSRV 1.64, similarly OK for this backend.
+const TRUE: BOOL = 1;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    let result = unsafe { ProcessPrng(dest.as_mut_ptr().cast::<u8>(), dest.len()) };
+    // Since Windows 10, calls to the user-mode RNG are guaranteed to never
+    // fail during runtime (rare windows W); `ProcessPrng` will only ever
+    // return 1 (which is how windows represents TRUE).
+    // See the bottom of page 6 of the aforementioned Windows RNG
+    // whitepaper for more information.
+    debug_assert!(result == TRUE);
+    Ok(())
+}
diff --git a/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/windows7.rs b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/windows7.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8a353a9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/getrandom/src/backends/windows7.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+//! Legacy implementation for Windows XP and later
+//!
+//! For targets where we cannot use ProcessPrng (added in Windows 10), we use
+//! RtlGenRandom. See windows.rs for a more detailed discussion of the Windows
+//! RNG APIs (and why we don't use BCryptGenRandom). On versions prior to
+//! Windows 10, this implementation is secure. On Windows 10 and later, this
+//! implementation behaves identically to the windows.rs implementation, except
+//! that it forces the loading of an additonal DLL (advapi32.dll).
+//!
+//! This implementation will not work on UWP targets (which lack advapi32.dll),
+//! but such targets require Windows 10, so can use the standard implementation.
+use crate::Error;
+use core::{ffi::c_void, mem::MaybeUninit};
+
+pub use crate::util::{inner_u32, inner_u64};
+
+// Binding to the Windows.Win32.Security.Authentication.Identity.RtlGenRandom
+// API. Don't use windows-targets as it doesn't support Windows 7 targets.
+#[link(name = "advapi32")]
+extern "system" {
+    #[link_name = "SystemFunction036"]
+    fn RtlGenRandom(randombuffer: *mut c_void, randombufferlength: u32) -> BOOLEAN;
+}
+#[allow(clippy::upper_case_acronyms)]
+type BOOLEAN = u8;
+const TRUE: BOOLEAN = 1u8;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn fill_inner(dest: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    // Prevent overflow of u32
+    let chunk_size = usize::try_from(i32::MAX).expect("Windows does not support 16-bit targets");
+    for chunk in dest.chunks_mut(chunk_size) {
+        let chunk_len = u32::try_from(chunk.len()).expect("chunk size is bounded by i32::MAX");
+        let ret = unsafe { RtlGenRandom(chunk.as_mut_ptr().cast::<c_void>(), chunk_len) };
+        if ret != TRUE {
+            return Err(Error::WINDOWS_RTL_GEN_RANDOM);
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+impl Error {
+    /// Call to Windows [`RtlGenRandom`](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ntsecapi/nf-ntsecapi-rtlgenrandom) failed.
+    pub(crate) const WINDOWS_RTL_GEN_RANDOM: Error = Self::new_internal(10);
+}